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Abstract
This study provides an empirical investigation of the incidence and antecedents of
contractual renegotiations in strategic alliances. We bring together initial conditions based on
transaction cost theory and ex post contingencies highlighted by recent conceptual and
qualitative research on the evolution of collaborative agreements. The results indicate that
firms tend to change the governance of alliances when a misalignment exists between the
chosen structure and features of the transaction. Further, we find that asset specificity affects
alliance design as well as post-formation governance decisions. Contractual alterations are
more likely in the presence of strategic change and when firms employ less extensive ex post
deterrents in their alliances. We find no evidence that cross-border ventures are any more or
less likely to experience contractual renegotiations than domestic alliances.
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Introduction
Theoretical and empirical research on alliances has advanced significantly over the
past decade.  Drawing upon transaction cost economics (e.g., Hennart, 1988), real options
theory (e.g., Kogut, 1991), the resource-based view of the firm (e.g., Eisenhardt &
Schoonhoven, 1996), network analysis and sociology (e.g., Gulati, 1998), and other
disciplines, this research has focused on firms’ rationales for alliance investment and their
governance decisions.  For instance, work on alliance formation has considered research
topics such as alliance trends (e.g., Hagedoorn, 1993), the choice between alliances and
acquisitions (e.g., Balakrishnan & Koza, 1993), and alternative governance structures for
alliances (e.g., Oxley, 1997).  
Despite these advances, it is generally recognized that there are limits to such static
treatments of alliances and firms’ governance decisions. Williamson (1991), for instance,
cautions that many alliances may be disequilibrium organizational forms. Developing
research on alliance instability and the short life-spans of many alliances appear to bear out
this observation (e.g., Beamish, 1985; Franko, 1971; Killing, 1983; Reynolds, 1979; Stuckey,
1983). Doz and Hamel contend that “[m]anaging the alliance relationship over time is usually
more important than crafting the initial formal design” (1998: xv).  Based on this observation
and the fact that firms make governance decisions in alliances not only at the formation stage
but after they have been set up, one purpose of our study is to examine firms’ governance
decisions in the post-formation context.  
In fact, the need to study post-formation alliance phenomena has triggered a number
of recent studies on alliance termination. Researchers have identified many factors at
multiple levels of analysis affecting alliance termination.  For instance, environmental factors
contributing to alliance termination include changing industry concentration levels (Kogut,
1989), industry demand shocks (Kogut, 1991), and national cultural differences (e.g.,
Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996; Barkema & Vermeulen, 1997; Park & Ungson, 1997).
Other research has examined transaction level features such as opportunism (Park & Russo,
1996) and mode of entry (Li, 1995; Pennings, Barkema & Douma, 1994) as well as partner
characteristics such as prior experiences with collaboration (Barkema, Shenkar, Vermeulen,
& Bell, 1997), firms’ learning abilities (Hamel, 1991), and partners’ evolving capabilities
(Nakamura, Shaver, & Yeung, 1996).
Thus, the most recent research on alliances has begun to attend to their dynamics;
however, this work has primarily focused on the termination stage of inter-firm collaboration
rather than on the developmental paths and incremental governance changes that alliancesexperience. Many researchers have acknowledged the importance of sociological and
dynamic aspects of collaborative processes (Larson, 1992; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Gulati,
1995; Jones, Hesterly, Fladmoe-Lindquist, & Borgatti, 1998; Madhok & Tallman, 1998).
Similarly, recent conceptual contributions highlight the importance of changing resource
commitments (Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 1998), the relevance of bargaining power shifts
(Inkpen & Beamish, 1997), and the embeddedness of alliances in firms’ evolving strategies
(Koza & Lewin, 1998).  These conceptual developments notwithstanding, little empirical
attention has been given to the issue of alliance evolution.
This paper builds upon recent conceptual and qualitative research on alliance
processes to empirically investigate governance changes in alliances.  Zajac and Olsen (1993)
discuss how firms’ alliance reconfiguration efforts cause them to cycle back through prior
initializing and processing stages. Their treatment of alliance dynamics contrasts prior
treatments of alliance adaptation within more linear life-cycle models (see Parkhe, 1996 for a
review). Similarly, Ring and Van de Ven (1994) develop a process framework in which
alliance evolution consists of iterative sequences of negotiation, commitment, and execution
stages. Different formal and informal interactions take place within each of these stages, the
outcomes of which partners judge in terms of efficiency as well as equity. Doz (1996)
presents a framework of alliance evolution that suggests how initial conditions foster learning
along multiple dimensions. As learning occurs, partners re-evaluate the alliance and their
adaptability, and readjustments serve to calibrate revised conditions for the partnership.
Ariño and de la Torre (1998) integrate this model with Ring and Van de Ven’s (1994) model
to trace alliances’ evolutionary paths and to explore the roles of initial conditions, external
shocks, and relationship quality.  Kumar and Nti (1998) propose that partners’ interaction and
absorptive capacities combine to influence realized outcomes, and manifest discrepancies in
outcomes or processes contribute to alliance instability.
In the present study, we use econometric analyses to study the incidence and
antecedents of contractual renegotiations in strategic alliances based on a survey on Spanish
firms’ collaborative agreements. One objective of the study is to bring together governance
research with recent conceptual and qualitative work on alliance evolution.  In particular, we
focus attention on two initial conditions –governance misalignment and asset specificity– that
prompt firms to make governance changes in their alliances and bear the costs and risks of
contractual renegotiations.  We also consider two ex post contingencies –environmental and
strategic change– that potentially bear upon the post-formation dynamics of alliances.
Hypotheses on these initial conditions and ex post contingencies are developed in the next
section.  
Results appear in a section following a discussion of the research design. We find
that contractual renegotiations tend to stem from initial conditions of governance
misalignment and asset specificity, and that strategic change also brings about contractual
renegotiations. These findings challenge conventional governance research assuming that a
selection environment quickly weeds out theoretically inefficient governance forms before
managers intervene. They also show how asset specificity influences firms’ governance
decisions even after alliances have been formed. Also, they affirm the need to view alliances
as embedded within parent firms’ evolving strategies. Environmental changes do not appear
to affect contractual renegotiations, however, in part because alliances subject to these
changes had more extensive contractual safeguards in place. While international research
identifies instability in general and contractual renegotiations in particular as distinguishing
features of cross-border collaboration (e.g., Blodgett, 1992; Killing, 1983; Yan & Zeng,
1999), we find no evidence that cross-border alliances are any more or less unstable than
domestic ones.  A concluding section discusses the implications of these findings and offers
avenues for future research.
2Development of hypotheses
In formulating hypotheses to identify factors that potentially shape governance
changes in alliances, we sought to examine key initial conditions identified by governance
research and ex post contingencies viewed as relevant to alliance evolutionary processes in
more recent conceptual and qualitative studies of inter-firm collaboration. Drawing on
transaction cost theory, we first discuss the roles of governance misfit and asset specificity.
We then turn to environmental and strategic changes that can affect the likelihood of
contractual renegotiations in alliances.
Initial Conditions
Since early conceptual research on alliances by authors such as Anderson and
Gatignon (1986), Beamish and Banks (1987), and Hennart (1988), transaction cost theory has
been one of the dominant paradigms used to study alliances.  Based on their work, theoretical
research in transaction cost theory, and related perspectives such as internalization theory and
the eclectic paradigm (e.g., Buckley & Casson, 1976; Caves, 1996; Dunning, 1988; Teece,
1986; Williamson, 1985), a vast number of studies have investigated firms’ alliance
investment decisions (e.g., Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Gomes-Casseres, 1989, 1990;
Mitchell & Singh, 1992; Teece, 1992) and their alliance design choices (e.g., Osborn &
Baughn, 1990; Oxley, 1997; Pan, 1996; Parkhe, 1993; Pisano, 1989; Shan, 1991).
Because our interest lies in firms’ decisions regarding post-formation governance
changes, and because the above-mentioned studies have focused solely on firms’ ex ante
governance decisions, it is important to point out two fundamental propositions and
assumptions that underlie this body of research.  The first is the ‘discriminating alignment’
proposition of transaction cost theory, which states that the efficiency of a transaction will be
enhanced when an alignment exists between the chosen governance structure and the
fundamental attributes of the transaction and the broader contracting environment
(Williamson, 1985).  For instance, Williamson (1991) offers a model portraying how firms
choose between market, intermediate, and internalized forms of governance.  
Second, and building off the discriminating alignment proposition, empirical studies
using transaction cost theory to specify governance models either explicitly or implicitly
employ a selection approach to fit (e.g., Drazin & Van de Ven, 1985).  By assuming that
managers are far-sighted and that inefficient governance decisions are rapidly weeded out by
competitive forces (Williamson, 1994: 371), researchers developing reduced form
governance choice models proceed to draw efficiency implications from the factors affecting
firms’ governance decisions, even though costs or performance are not explicitly modeled.
Despite many appealing features of this approach, there are several reasons to believe
that misaligned transactions may in fact exist.  For example, environmental selection pressures
likely vary under different conditions, with inefficient governance structures surviving for
longer in more tranquil environments than in more competitive contexts.  Moreover, firms
with slack financial resources may be in a position to sustain inefficient structures for some
period of time. Thus, it is plausible that misaligned transactions exist and, as we discuss below,
that a firm may seek to adjust a misaligned transaction to enhance efficiency.
Two scenarios arise for a misaligned collaborative agreement that may prompt firms
to alter the alliance’s governance mechanisms. In the first instance, ‘excessive’ governance is
put in place for a comparatively simple exchange relationship. For instance, a firm may use
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incentives provided by shared equity and the control and monitoring rights provided by a
joint board may not be necessary to achieve coordination (Borys & Jemison, 1989; Pisano,
1989). The result of excessive governance, therefore, can be politicized or slow decision-
making and higher bureaucracy costs (Williamson, 1985, 1991).
In the second instance, ‘insufficient’ governance is put in place for a more complex
exchange relationship.  For instance, a firm may use a non-equity arrangement to govern an
alliance in which the threat of opportunism is significant.  In this case, the incentives and
control provided by equity would be valuable (Oxley, 1997). A firm in an alliance lacking
adequate governance mechanisms or safeguards can be exposed to ex post contractual
hazards such as hold-up risks and moral hazard (Williamson, 1985, 1991).
Due to governance misalignment costs such as these, the firm may seek to alter the
relationship to better fit the needs of the collaborative agreement and the environment in
which it is situated.  Although firms will likely anticipate many of the contractual hazards
and problems inherent in a collaborative relationship at the alliance design stage (Williamson,
1994), one also expects that some firms will make governance mistakes, and some firms will
learn about the exact nature of their collaborative challenges after the alliance has been
formed. Thus, based on the fundamental discriminating alignment proposition and the
selection approach to fit discussed above, we are interested in examining whether contractual
alterations are in fact responsive to governance misfit, indicating whether firms exercise
discretion in modifying the governance structures of their alliances.  
Hypothesis  1: The likelihood of contractual renegotiation will be positively related to
governance misfit
While it is important to recognize that firms’ governance decisions need not be
once-and-for-all propositions that take place at the alliance design stage, it is also important
to recognize that changing alliances over time involves costs and risks (e.g., Macaulay, 1963;
Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Williamson, 1985).  For instance, at the limit, the costs involved in
attempting to alter an alliance –legal fees, reorganization expenses, opportunity costs due to
management time, reputation costs, and so forth– may outweigh the benefits from bringing a
governance structure into better alignment. To the extent that costs such as these are
significant relative to efficiency gains, it might be better for the firm to allow the transaction
to persist in misalignment rather than attempting to alter its governance structure.  
It follows, therefore, that firms will be selective when making governance changes
in strategic alliances. If the firm has made minimal transaction-specific investments in the
alliance, it may be difficult to justify incurring ex post costs to renegotiate and adapt the
alliance. By contrast, for alliances to which the firm makes significant resource commitments
that are not fully redeployable, the firm has an incentive to monitor the alliance more closely
and also to bear renegotiation costs to adapt the alliance. Firms making transaction-specific
investments are also subject to a partner’s demands for change, which may be motivated by a
recognition that gains from hold-up are possible (Williamson, 1985).
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specificity
Ex Post Contingencies
The previous hypotheses considered two initial conditions highlighted by transaction
cost theory that shape firms’ desire to change the governance of alliances.  Governance misfit
prompts firms to alter alliances to enhance efficiency, and firms are more likely to be willing
to bear the costs of renegotiation when they have made transaction-specific investments in an
alliance. Recent qualitative research on the evolutionary processes of alliances would suggest
that  ex post contingencies may also bring about contractual renegotiations. We focus in
particular on the roles played by environmental and strategic changes.
Conceptual research on alliance processes contends that environmental changes
affect the dynamics of an alliance by altering parent firm’s assessments of an alliance’s value
and perceptions of equity.  Zajac and Olsen (1993), for instance, suggest that changes in the
alliance’s environment lead to changes in the value of an alliance, prompting firms to
transition from a processing stage to a reconfiguring stage, and then back through initializing
and processing stages. Likewise, Ring and Van de Ven (1994) emphasize that legal and
psychological contracts set the stage for the execution of the alliance through role and
personal interactions.  Partners’ commitments and alliance execution change over time based
on partners’ assessments of efficiency and equity.  Assessments along these dimensions may
be altered by a change in the alliance’s environment, stimulating negotiation and commitment
processes anew.
Recent qualitative research also suggests that environmental change may contribute
to contractual renegotiations in alliances. Doz’s (1996) model identifies a number of initial
conditions (i.e., task definition, partners’ routines, interface structure, and expectations) that
facilitate or hamper learning on five dimensions –environment, task, process, skills, and
goals. This learning leads to re-evaluations of efficiency, equity, and adaptability,
contributing to readjustments and revised conditions. In his model, the environment is a
source of learning, and shifts in the environment therefore bring about new opportunities for
learning and contribute to new adjustment cycles. Ariño and de la Torre (1998) trace out
various learning-action-reaction paths for alliances and the specific decision rules followed
by collaborators in making adjustments.  For instance, they note that external changes trigger
adjustment processes to restore equilibrium in equity and efficiency conditions.
Based on the arguments of conceptual research on alliance processes and the
findings from qualitative studies of alliance evolution, we wish to test the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The likelihood of contractual renegotiation will be greater when a change in
the environment affects the alliance
This research also emphasizes that changes in a firm’s strategy can contribute to
adjustment in alliances.  In Zajac and Olsen’s (1993) model, the redefinition of strategy leads
firms to cycle back through initializing and processing stages.  In Doz’s (1996) framework,
changes in strategy can alter the value of alliance learning along the five dimensions he
identifies, leading partners to revise their expectations of efficiency, equity, and adaptability.
Ariño and de la Torre (1998) discuss how the emergence of overlap in two parent firms’
competitive strategies and the joint venture’s call for greater coordination with one firm
triggered readjustment in the alliance they studied.
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dynamics of alliances. For instance, in Kumar and Nti’s (1998) outcome and process
discrepancy model of alliance dynamics, shifts in strategy potentially contribute to outcome
discrepancies relating to the firm’s ability to achieve its economic and learning objectives.
Koza and Lewin (1998) emphasize that alliances are embedded in the strategies of parent
firms and, as such, need to be understood and studied as a component of firms’ adaptation
choices over time.  If alliances co-evolve with firms’ strategies as they suggest, then alliance
adjustments such as contractual renegotiations should be associated with changes in strategy.
Hypothesis 4: The likelihood of contractual renegotiation will be greater when a change in
the firm’s strategy affects the alliance
Methodology
Data
Sample. In order to identify a target population of collaborative agreements for this
study, we examined Funk and Scott’s Countries Index – Europe to identify Spanish firms
engaging in alliance activity.  Firms engaging in 674 dyadic alliances were identified, but due
to financial and time constraints our data collection efforts focused on those industries most
active in alliances, which provided a total of 346 firms engaging in 436 alliances. The target
informant was the person most directly related to the alliance. Sacrificing quantity for quality,
we sent out questionnaires only to those firms in which this person could be clearly identified
(see Table 1). Of the 189 surveys mailed, we received 91 responses, which represents a 48
percent response rate. We attribute this high response rate to the care taken in identifying the
appropriate respondent and to the follow-up procedure used (Dillman, 1978), which included
supplemental phone calls. As an indication of the competence of key informants, over 63
percent of the respondents had participated directly in the negotiation of the alliance in
question, and on average they had been involved in the alliance for 4.9 years.  
Table 1. Industries and Responses
Number of   Percentage
surveys of total Number of Percentage of
Industry Description mailed mailed responses responses
Energy (petroleum and electricity) 19 0.1 6 6.6
Chemicals 15 7.9 14 15.4
Machinery except electrical 7 3.7 5 5.5
Electronic equipment 7 3.7 4 4.4
Transportation equipment 5 2.6 4 4.4
Transportation 8 4.2 6 6.6
Communications 2 1.1 0 0.0
Financial services 95 50.3 37 40.6
Other services 31 16.4 15 16.5
–––– –––– –––– ––––
Totals 189 100.0 91 100.0
6In order to examine potential nonresponse bias, we assessed possible differences in
alliance industries and in firm size, measured by the number of employees, between early and
late respondents under the assumption that late respondents are more similar to non-
respondents than early respondents are to non-respondents (Armstrong & Overton, 1977).
An analysis comparing the sectoral distribution of alliances for early and late respondents
yielded an insignificant Chi-square value of 8.54 (180 d.f., p = 0.29), and a one-way ANOVA
for firm size across these groups gave an insignificant F-value of 0.67 (i.e., 86 d.f., p = 0.42).
After accounting for missing data, 80 alliances were available for analysis. Additional
descriptive statistics on the sample appear in the results section.
Survey instrument. Preliminary versions of the questionnaire were reviewed by
business scholars to ensure face validity. The survey was then translated into Spanish and
reviewed by two Spanish-speaking researchers.  The translated survey was pre-tested with six
Spanish executives experienced in managing alliances, and several changes were made after
the pre-testing stage. The final Spanish version was reverse translated into English by a
person unfamiliar with the study, and there was a high degree of correspondence between the
Spanish and English versions.
Although our dependent variable (i.e., based on whether or not the alliance
experienced a contractual renegotiation) is an objective indicator of alliance change, we
sought to address the effects of consistency artifacts and possible common method bias.
First, we arranged the questionnaire items so that the subjective items appeared prior to the
question on contractual renegotiation (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977). Second, we used Harman’s
(1967) single-factor test to examine whether a significant amount of common method
variance exists in the data.  If so, a factor analysis of all of the variables will generate a single
factor or a general factor that accounts for most of the variance. Unrotated factor analysis
using the eigenvalue-greater-than-one criterion revealed four factors, and the first factor
explained only 17.9 percent of the variance in the data. Thus, we concluded that the analysis
was not subject to common method bias.
Model Specifications and Measures
Model specification. The basic structure of the models testing antecedents of
contractual renegotiation is as follows: 
(1) Contractual Renegotiation = γ 0 + γ 1 Governance Misfit + γ 2 Asset Specificity
+γ 3 Environmental Change + γ 4 Strategic Change
+γ 5 Ex Post Deterrents + γ 6 Cross-Border
+ γ 7 Alliance Age + ε .
Contractual renegotiation. We determined whether the parent firm altered its
collaborative agreement by asking respondents whether the initial contract was renegotiated
during the course of the alliance.  Contractual Renegotiation therefore takes on a value of one
if the alliance agreement was altered, and zero otherwise.
Initial condition variables. The first explanatory variable we considered is the
degree of misalignment between the firm’s choice of alliance governance structure and
the attributes of the alliance as well as its broader contracting environment. Following prior
research by Anderson (1988) and Silverman, Nickerson, and Freeman (1997), we measured
governance misfit by employing a governance choice model to determine how firms’ actual
alliance design decisions correspond with those implied by transactional features (see
equation (2) below).  First, we needed to partition the alliance portion of the governance
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equity agreements (e.g., Gulati, 1995, Osborn & Baughn, 1990; Pisano, 1989, 1990). Thus,
Equity assumes a value of one for equity alliances, and zero for contractual alliances.  While
alternative taxonomies might be employed, there is no consensus on this issue, and non-
equity and equity alliances have different governance properties, the latter offering control
and incentives provided by joint board oversight and residual claimancy (Hennart, 1988; Chi,
1994).  Governance Misfit was then defined as 1 – p for an equity alliance, and p for a non-
equity alliance, where p is the probability estimate for an equity alliance, which was modeled
using the following specification:
(2)  Equity = β 0 + β 1 Asset Specificity + β 2 Potential Partners + β 3 Prior Ties
+ β 4 Cross-Border + β 5 Firm Size + ε . 
While our interest centers on the effects of governance misfit on the likelihood of
contractual renegotiations in alliances (i.e., as portrayed in equation (1)), we will first discuss
this model and its constituent variables.  We then turn to the other explanatory variables that
appear in the model for contractual renegotiations.  
Asset Specificity was constructed as an unweighted index based on four indicators,
each of which was measured on a five-point scale ranging from negligible to substantial:
“Our investment in dedicated personnel specific to this venture is…,” “Our investment in
dedicated facilities to this venture is…,” “If we decided to stop this venture, the difficulty we
would have in redeploying our people and facilities presently serving the venture to other
uses would be…,” and “If this venture were to dissolve, our non-recoverable investments in
equipment, people, etc. would be…” (e.g., Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Parkhe, 1993).  With a
Cronbach alpha of 0.73, this index for asset specificity demonstrated satisfactory reliability
(Nunnally, 1978). Because asset specificity increases hold-up risks (Klein, Crawford, &
Alchian, 1978) and more hierarchical, equity-based alliances will be appropriate relative to
purely contractual collaborations under these conditions (Williamson, 1991), we expect a
positive coefficient for Asset Specificity in the governance choice model. This variable also
represents our second initial condition variable used in the contractual renegotiation model.
Potential Partners was measured as the number of other available alliance partners.
Specifically, respondents were asked to indicate the number of firms with the necessary skills
that are available to carry out the same activity.  This variable was measured on a four-point
scale (i.e., 1 corresponds to none, 2 to 1-2, 3 to 3-10, and 4 to more than 10). The Potential
Partners variable therefore serves as an inverse proxy for small numbers bargaining.  As the
number of potential partners decreases, the firm is more exposed to contractual hazards such
as moral hazard and hold-up since switching partners is difficult and costly (Williamson,
1975).  In such instances, the control and incentives provided by equity can prove valuable,
so we expect a negative coefficient for Potential Partners in the governance choice model.
Pisano (1989) provides supporting evidence: In the biotechnology industry, the likelihood
that firms will use equity alliances rather than pure contracts declines as the number of
potential partners increases.
Prior Ties captures whether or not the collaborators had prior alliances with each
other.  Therefore, Prior Ties equals one if the partners had a prior collaborative agreement
together, and zero otherwise. Partners who have had prior alliances are thought to exhibit
greater trust (Gulati, 1995) and, given a lower threat of opportunism, they are able to rely on
less complex governance arrangements to achieve their alliance objectives (Williamson,
1979). Prior ties can also promote the development of relational capabilities (e.g., Dyer &
Singh, 1998) that can substitute for more formal governance mechanisms. Thus, we expect
that Prior Ties will have a negative coefficient in the governance choice model.
8To account for broader features of the contracting environment, we introduced a
control for whether or not the alliance is cross-border or domestic. The variable Cross-Border
takes on a value of one if the two partners are from different countries, and zero otherwise.
Gulati (1995) suggests that international alliances are more apt to be structured as equity
alliances than contractual agreements because greater information is available about domestic
firms, reputational consequences of opportunism are more severe in the domestic setting, and
character-based trust (Zucker, 1986) emerges between firms that are socially similar.
Finally, to address parent firm resources and other potential influences at the firm level,
we incorporated Firm Size as a control variable. Respondents were asked to indicate the number
of employees in their firm on a 7-point scale (i.e., 1 corresponds to less than 50, 2 to 51-150, 3 to
151-250, 4 to 251-500, 5 to 501-1000, 6 to 1001 to 5000, and 7 to more than 5000).
Ex Post Contingency Variables. Our third and fourth hypotheses considered the
possible effects of ex post shifts in the venture’s environment and changes in the firm’s
strategy on the likelihood of contractual renegotiations. Respondents indicated whether or not
there had been any changes in the venture’s environment (i.e., Environmental Change) or in
the firm’s strategy (i.e., Strategic Change) that substantially affected the venture.
Control variables. While we sought to develop a parsimonious model of factors
potentially influencing contractual renegotiations in alliances, we also wanted to control for
relevant contingencies that might influence alliance dynamics and might be related to an
alliance’s initial conditions or ex post contingencies considered in the hypotheses.  
First, because firms may employ contractual safeguards to mitigate moral hazard and
hold-up risks and to avoid renegotiations, we employed a measure of ex post deterrents
developed by Parkhe (1993). This measure is constructed based on a checklist of contractual
safeguards obtained from a computer-aided search of the legal literature (e.g., Macneil, 1978,
1981; Narasimhan, 1989; Practicing Law Institute, 1986). Specifically, respondents were asked
to indicate which contractual safeguards were put into the agreement: 1) periodic written reports
of all relevant transactions; 2) prompt written notice of any departures from the agreement; 3) the
right to examine and audit all relevant records through a firm of CPAs; 4) designation of certain
information as proprietary and subject to confidentiality provisions of the contract; 5) non-use of
proprietary information even after termination of agreement; 6) termination of agreement;
7) arbitration clauses; and 8) lawsuit provisions. With these safeguards arrayed in increasing
order of stringency as shown, the composite index was constructed as follows:
(3)  Ex Post Deterrents = 
where Di equals i if the ith safeguard was employed, and zero otherwise (e.g., one if the first
safeguard was employed, zero otherwise; two if the second safeguard was employed, zero
otherwise; etc.). Thus, the variable Ex Post Deterrents is a continuous measure ranging from
zero to one and increasing in the level of contractual safeguards in the alliance.
Second, we controlled for whether the alliance was a cross-border or domestic
collaboration. Instability is regarded as a distinguishing feature of international alliances
(e.g., Inkpen & Beamish, 1997; Parkhe, 1991), yet empirical research provides mixed
evidence on the instability of international alliances (e.g., Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996;
Barkema & Vermeulen, 1997; Park & Ungson, 1997).  While prior research has assessed the
termination of cross-border collaborations, we wish to examine whether cross-border
alliances are more or less likely to experience contractual alterations, which can be seen as






∑Finally, we controlled for the age of the alliance, measured in years.  Older alliances
are more likely to be subject to different sources of instability (Kogut, 1988), and it is also
important to control for the opportunities a firm has had to make adjustments in the
contractual agreement.  Incorporating a control for alliance age also helps to control for other
effects at the alliance level.
Results
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for variables appearing
in the governance choice model. Forty-five percent of the collaborative agreements were
equity alliances, and twenty percent of the collaborators had prior alliances with each other.  A
majority of the alliances, 84 percent, were cross-border collaborations.  The median firm had
between 501 and 1000 employees.  The bivariate results suggest that firms will choose equity
alliances over non-equity agreements when asset specificity (p < 0.01) is substantial and when
firms have collaborated in the past (p < 0.05). However, it is also apparent that large firms tend
to make lower levels of transaction-specific investments in their alliances (p < 0.01), and firms
are more likely to partner with firms with which they have collaborated in the past in contexts
in which many other prospective partners are present (p < 0.01). Thus, multivariate analysis is
needed to examine the partial effects of the explanatory variables. The correlations among the
explanatory variables also raise the question of whether multicollinearity is present, yet the
maximum variance inflation factor (VIF) for variables in the governance choice model is 1.17,
well below the accepted rule of thumb value of ten indicating multicollinearity problems
(Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1985).  
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix for
Variables in the Governance Choice Model a
Variable Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) Equity Alliance 0.45 0.50 –
(2) Asset Specificity 9.21 3.35 0.32 ** –
(3) Potential Partners 2.83 1.03 –0.06 –0.06 –
(4) Prior Ties 0.20 0.40 0.24 * 0.06 0.30** –
(5) Cross-Border 0.84 0.37 –0.08 0.04 0.02 0.05 –
(6) Firm Size 4.40 2.13 0.02 –0.32** 0.14 0.17 0.08
a N = 80. † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Table 3 presents estimation results for the governance choice model used to calculate
the governance misfit variable. The model is significant on an overall basis (p < 0.001). The
parameter estimates are consistent with the fundamental predictions of transaction cost theory:
Firms adopt equity structures when making transaction-specific investments (p < 0.01) and
when few alternative partners are available to provide the option to switch (p < 0.05).  Contrary
to prior research on the role of trust in alliances, the findings suggest that equity structures are
more prevalent among firms that have collaborated in the past (p < 0.01), and cross-border
alliances are no more or less likely to be equity structures than domestic collaborations.





Asset Specificity 0.16 **
(0.05)
Potential Partners –0.39 *
(0.17)






χ 2 20.51 ***
b N = 80. Standard errors appear in parentheses. Positive coefficients indicate that increases in the variable raise
the likelihood of an equity structure (i.e., Equity Alliance = 1) vis-à-vis a non-equity structure (i.e., Equity
Alliance = 0). † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for variables in the contractual
renegotiation model appear in Table 4. One-fifth of the sampled alliances underwent a
contractual renegotiation. Likewise, twenty percent of the alliances were subject to an
environmental change that substantially affected the collaboration. Fewer alliances, ten
percent, were subject to a strategic change by a parent firm. As one would expect, these
changes were more likely to occur for older alliances (both p < 0.01), and older alliances
were also more likely to experience contractual renegotiations (p < 0.01). As before, we
assessed VIFs to check for multicollinearity, but the maximum VIF of 1.29 for variables
appearing in the contractual renegotiation models provided no evidence of such problems.
Table 5 presents estimates for factors influencing contractual renegotiation in
alliances. Model I presents a baseline specification consisting of the three control variables
only.  Model II adds the explanatory variables for initial conditions and ex post contingencies.
Both models are significant on an overall basis (p < 0.05 and p < 0.001, respectively), and
Model II provides a significant improvement in explanatory power over Model I (p < 0.001).
Further, likelihood ratio tests indicated that Model II represents a significant improvement in
explanatory power relative to a model that incorporates only the controls and initial
conditions (χ 2 = 7.21, p < 0.05) and relative to a model that incorporates only the controls and
ex post contingencies (χ 2 = 17.75, p < 0.001).
11Table 4. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix for
Variables in the Contractual Renegotiation Model c
Variable Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) Contractual renegotiation 0.20 0.40 –
(2) Governance Misfit 0.39 0.20 0.20† –
(3) Asset Specificity 9.18 3.47 0.31** –0.12 –
(4) Environmental Change 0.20 0.40 0.29* –0.04 0.14 –
(5) Strategic Change 0.10 0.30 0.31** 0.13 –0.07 0.19 –
(6) Ex Post Deterrents 0.46 0.33 –0.09 –0.06 0.16 0.23† 0.15 –
(7) Cross-Border 0.83 0.38 0.13 –0.15 0.05 0.13 0.15 0.16 –
(8) Alliance Age 3.89 4.79 0.32**–0.003 0.05 0.35** 0.37** 0.19 0.16
c N = 71. † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Table 5. Antecedents of Contractual Renegotiations in Strategic Alliances d
Variable Model  Model II Model II
Intercept –1.40 * –5.62 *** –5.52 ***
(0.51) (1.59) (1.62)
Ex Post Deterrents –0.95 –2.48 * –2.69 *
(0.60) (1.05) (1.09)
Cross-Border 0.51 0.49 0.44
(0.58) (0.71) (0.73)
Alliance Age 0.13 † 0.15 † 0.13
(0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
Governance Misfit – 3.10 * –
(1.47)
Governance Overfit – – 3-34 *
(1.51)
Governance Underfit – – 1.76
(1.81)
Asset Specificity – 0.29 ** 0.31 **
(0.10) (0.10)
Environmental Change – 0.78 0.80
(0.59) (0.62)
Strategic Change – 1.62 * 1.74 *
(0.73) (0.77)
χ 2 9.40 * 33.59 *** 35.38 ***
Log Likelihood. L (β ) –30.55 –18.45 –17.56
–2 [L (β I) – L (β )] – 24-20 *** 25-98 ***
–2 [L (β II) – L (β III)] – – 1.78 (n.s.)
d N = 71. Standard errors appear in parentheses. Positive coefficients indicate that increases in the variable raise the
likelihood of contractual renegotiation (i.e., Contractual Renegotiation = 1). † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,
*** p < 0.001.
12It is worth noting that Model II restricts the effects of excessive or insufficient
governance to be equal.  As noted earlier, governance “overfit” occurs when the firm adopts
an equity governance structure for relatively simple transactions, and governance “underfit”
occurs when the firm adopts a non-equity governance structure in the face of contractual
hazards.  Since the effects of governance overfit and underfit may or may not be symmetric
empirically, Model III offers an unconstrained specification that disaggregates governance
misfit into these two components. In particular, for equity alliances Governance Overfit is
defined as 1 – p and Governance Underfit as zero, while for non-equity alliances Governance
Overfit is defined as zero and Governance Underfit as p (i.e., Governance Overfit +
Governance Underfit = Governance Misfit). As such, if γ 1 is the coefficient for Governance
Misfit in Model II, and γ 1’and γ 1”are the coefficients for Governance Overfit and Governance
Underfit, respectively, in Model III, a likelihood ratio test comparing Models II and III
assesses whether excessive governance and insufficient governance affect alliances equally
(i.e., γ 1’ = γ 1”=γ 1). The insignificant test statistic (i.e., χ 2 = 1.78, n.s.) suggests that the effects
of excessive and insufficient governance on the likelihood of contractual renegotiation are
equivalent, so the restricted specification appearing as Model II is appropriate.
In addition to separating out the potential effects of excessive and insufficient
governance, we performed supplementary tests to test the sensitivity of the results and
alternative specifications relative to Model II. These tests explored whether initial conditions
and  ex post contingencies affect the likelihood of contractual change independently or
interactively.  One might anticipate, for instance, that the influence of asset specificity is
exacerbated by an exogenous shock or that governance misfit becomes more problematic
when the firm is undergoing a strategic change. However, separate tests indicated that
environmental change does not moderate the effects of asset specificity (i.e., p = 0.19) or
governance misfit (i.e., 0.44) nor does strategic change (i.e., p = 0.89 and p = 0.68,
respectively). These tests supported the modeling of initial conditions and ex post
contingencies as main effects.
Our first hypothesis suggested that firms will tend to renegotiate alliance contracts
when a misalignment is present between the chosen alliance governance structure and the
attributes of the transaction and the contracting environment. The results bear out this
prediction as governance misfit relates positively to the likelihood of contractual
renegotiation (p < 0.05).
The second hypothesis suggested that the likelihood of contractual renegotiations
will increase with asset specificity. The results provide support for this prediction. The
greater the transaction-specific investment made in the alliance, the greater the odds are that
partners will alter the collaborative agreement after forming the alliance (p < 0.01).
The remaining hypotheses considered the potential influence of ex post
contingencies on alliances’ post-formation governance changes. Firms appear to be no more
or less likely to alter the contracts of alliances subject to environmental change (i.e.,
hypothesis three) yet, consistent with hypothesis four, firms are more likely to renegotiate
alliances when there has been a strategic change affecting the collaborative agreement.  One
possible explanation for the lack of significance for the environmental change variable is that
firms tend to have put in place ex post deterrents for such ventures (p < 0.10), and firms using
contractual deterrents are less likely to alter collaborative agreements (p < 0.05).
Finally, the remaining controls deserve some comment. While prior research has
often considered instability in general and contractual renegotiations in particular to be
important aspects of international collaboration, we find no evidence that cross-border
13ventures are more likely to experience contractual renegotiations than domestic alliances.
There is, however, modest evidence that older alliances are more likely to experience
contractual alterations (p < 0.10) after controlling for other explanatory factors.
Discussion
Our finding on the incidence of contractual renegotiations indicates the relevance of
studying post-formation governance changes in alliances. As noted in the introduction,
alliance research historically has attended to issues surrounding the formation of
collaborative agreements and recently has begun to study alliance dynamics by investigating
alliance termination. Intermediate phenomena relating to governance changes in alliances
have been subject to comparatively little investigation, however.  Our focus is on one type of
governance change in alliances, contractual renegotiations, so future research might examine
other formal or informal means by which parent firms alter their collaborative agreements.  It
would also be valuable to investigate the decisions and tradeoffs firms make regarding the
ways in which they adapt their collaborative relationships because multiple tools are at their
disposal (e.g., control changes, personnel changes, equity changes, etc.).
To study the antecedents of contractual renegotiations in alliances, we brought
together initial conditions and ex post contingencies discussed in disjunct streams of alliance
research. The empirical evidence indicates that both initial conditions –highlighted by
transaction cost theory– and ex post contingencies –highlighted by recent conceptual and
qualitative research on alliance evolution– bear upon the post-formation governance changes
in alliances. Thus, both perspectives on alliances contribute to the understanding of
contractual renegotiations in collaborative agreements. Just as there is a need to consider
other types of alliance adaptation in future research, opportunities exist to investigate other
factors identified by these or other perspectives that influence the trajectories that alliances
follow. Work in both directions may ultimately lead to a typology of alliance adaptation,
matching the research and understanding that now exists on alliance formation and alliance
design issues.
Our study has theoretical implications for the individual perspectives employed to
understand the antecedents of contractual renegotiations. For transaction cost theory, the
findings show that firms alter alliance contracts in response to governance misalignment.
Although transaction cost treatments of firms’ governance decisions explicitly or implicitly
assume that a selection environment exists that is sufficiently strong to weed out theoretically
inefficient organizational forms (e.g., Williamson, 1991, 1994), we find that misaligned
governance structures exist and that managers intervene to alter their alliances’ governance
mechanisms. Although the effects of contractual hazards attending non-equity alliances need
not be equivalent to the effects of equity structures’ governance costs, we found that
governance underfit and overfit have the same implications for contractual renegotiations.
Our empirical evidence also reveals that asset specificity has an impact on firms’
governance decisions at the alliance formation stage as well as during post-formation stages
of collaboration. While prior research has investigated the implications of asset specificity for
alliance design (e.g., Oxley, 1997; Pisano, 1989), our results demonstrate that the effects of
asset specificity extend beyond alliance formation into firms’ collaborative relationships.
Moreover, the fact that firms renegotiate alliances in which they have made transaction-
specific investments suggests that firms selectively renegotiate collaborative relationships
that are worth the costs of adjustment. This finding also suggests that such changes in
14alliances may be outcroppings of hold-up problems. Along similar lines, the results indicate
that contractual renegotiations tend to occur in alliances with less extensive ex post
deterrents.  
Consistent with conceptual and qualitative research on alliance evolution, we find
that  ex post contingencies also exert an influence on the likelihood of contractual
renegotiations. Specifically, alliances are likely to experience contractual alterations when a
strategic change affects the collaborative relationship. This finding is consistent with the
perspective that alliances should be viewed within the context of parent firms’ evolving
strategies (Koza & Lewin, 1998). Similarly, research on alliances’ developmental processes
identifies a number of mechanisms by which strategic change may affect alliances. For
instance, Doz (1996) discusses alliance evolution from the perspective of parent firms’
learning along multiple dimensions. Kumar and Nti (1998), by contrast, indicate that shifts in
strategy potentially contribute to outcome or process discrepancies leading to alliance
adjustments.  Hence, the findings indicate the relevance of strategic change but, due to the
coarseness of our ex post contingency measures, we cannot draw conclusions on the
dimensions of strategic change or the precise mechanisms that appear to be most important.
With this limitation in mind, our results suggest that strategic change appears to be more
influential than environmental change, but future research is also needed to examine specific
dimensions of environmental change that affect alliances in different collaborative contexts
(e.g., currency shifts in cross-border alliances, the resolution of technological uncertainty in
biotech ventures, political or legal changes in developing countries, etc.).
Our results also show that cross-border ventures are no more or less likely to
experience contractual renegotiations than domestic alliances. This finding contrasts with
prior arguments and evidence that cultural dissimilarities are often the root cause of alliance
instability (e.g., Barkema & Vermeulen, 1997) and that trust accumulates more readily in
domestic alliances (e.g., Gulati, 1995). However, our results are broadly consistent with Park
and Ungson’s (1997) finding that cross-border ventures with partners from culturally-distant
countries are more stable. Additional research using different base samples is needed to
explore the generalizability of our evidence and examine potential differences in the
negotiation and renegotiation of alliances in domestic and cross-border contexts.
Finally, our findings confirm the importance of controlling for alliance age in future
studies on the dynamics of inter-firm collaboration. Kogut (1988) suggests that the
conclusions drawn from many studies of alliance instability are suspect because of the failure
to account for the age distribution of sampled alliances.  In the present study, for instance, we
found that alliances subject to strategic or environmental changes tended also to be the older
ones.  Because our focus is on the incidence and antecedents of contractual renegotiations, or
more evolutionary governance changes in alliances, extensions could examine whether such
governance changes affect the likelihood or timing of termination and the means by which
alliances come to an end.
In attempting to bring together and extend research on governance design and recent
work on alliance evolution, our study has other limitations that might be addressed in future
work. First, recent conceptual and qualitative research on alliance evolution (e.g., Ariño & de
la Torre, 1998; Doz, 1996; Kumar & Nti, 1998; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Zajac & Olsen,
1993) has proposed complex frameworks on alliance processes that are difficult to model
empirically in full due to chains of moderated relationships and feedback loops. Future
empirical analyses of alliance dynamics with larger samples and more fine-grained
information may be able to accommodate more of this complexity using structural models.
15Second, our study is silent on the efficiency or performance implications of ex post
governance changes in alliances.  It remains for future research to examine if alliances subject
to contractual renegotiations suffer efficiency or other penalties relative to alliances designed
with better-aligned governance structures or with more extensive ex post deterrents.  Given the
relevance of alliance evolution and practical issues surrounding the relative importance of
contractual completeness versus relationship flexibility as well as alliance design versus
alliance management (e.g., Doz & Hamel, 1998), we believe there are opportunities for
research on many different aspects of alliance dynamics that can contribute to the field’s
understanding of inter-firm collaboration.
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